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Mutual health organizations (MHOs) have been present in Senegal for years. Despite their 
benefits, in most areas take-up rates remain low. Using randomized controlled trials, we 
evaluate the effect of an insurance literacy module, communicating the benefits and functioning 
of health microinsurance, as well as three cross-cutting marketing treatments. The results from 
our various marketing treatments indicate a positive and significant effect on health insurance 
adoption, particularly for poor households, increasing take-up by around 35 - 40%. The 
insurance literacy module does not seem to have a positive impact on take-up decisions. We 
attempt to provide different contextual reasons for this result.  
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1 Introduction 
In developing countries, the poor face high costs when accessing health care and need to insure 
themselves against health shocks. However, given that formal health insurance is prohibitively 
expensive, they must often, with proven success, use informal means of insuring themselves 
(see amongst many others, Fafchamps et al. 2003). However, the imperfect nature of this 
informal insurance entails severe consequences for their aptitudes in dealing with risk, 
smoothing their consumption and acquiring human capital (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). Indeed, 
health shocks lead to direct expenditures for medicine and treatment, which typically require 
out-of-pocket payments (OOP) and also entail indirect costs related to a reduction in 
productivity. One World Health Organisation (WHO) study (WHO, 2007) estimated that OOP 
payments regularly exceed 50% of total health care spending in some low-income countries 
(particularly for some African nations) where national health systems are still nascent at best 
and only a small proportion of the population own private health insurance.  
 
Public health funding in Senegal has remained stable over recent years while overall per capita 
health expenditures have been increasing in the same period (World Bank, WDI). The lessening 
of the state’s ability to meet health care needs has rendered it unable to provide universal 
insurance for the population. This has led to the emergence of many community-based health 
insurance schemes (CBHIS) in Senegal.1 At the same time, the market has been ineffective in 
providing health insurance to low-income people, even in urban environments. Private insurers 
are often faced with significant adverse selection problems and high transaction costs, rendering 
their contracts prohibitively expensive to many. The poor can thus only resort to expedient 
transfers from relatives, self-insurance (selling assets, using precautionary savings, etc.) or 
health insurance schemes rooted in local organizations. The latter offer a form of insurance that 
allows members to pay regular affordable premiums to reduce OOP payments for healthcare 
upon falling ill. These schemes vary in design and implementation but are all not-for-profit 
organizations based on voluntary participation, underpinned by the concepts of mutual aid and 
social solidarity at the community level. In Senegal, CBHIS are known as ‘mutuelles de santé’ 
or mutual health organizations (MHOs). The number of MHOs in Senegal has grown from just 
13 in 1993 to more than 140 in 2007. The first law defining the juridical framework of MHOs 
was enacted in 2003 and a strategic plan for the development of MHOs (Plan Stratégique de 
Développement des Mutuelles de Santé) was initiated by the Minister of Health in 2004. Despite 
 
1 Health microinsurance programs have also emerged in India (Dror et al. 2007, Banerjee et al. 2014). 
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this growth, estimates from 2004 show that the take-up rate in the greater region of Thiès, the 
setting for this study, was close to a mere 5% (Smith et al., 2008).  
 
The literature analysing the factors influencing demand for CBHIS, based on household data, 
has burgeoned in recent years; Jütting (2003), Dror et al. (2007), Smith et al. (2008) and Ito and 
Kono (2010) represent just a few such empirical studies in developing countries. Recent studies 
have used randomized controlled trials to look at the role of financial literacy and marketing on 
the uptake of rainfall insurance products (Cole et al., 2013; Gaurav et al., 2011). 2 The primary 
contribution of this paper is that it is one of just a handful to investigate the roles that such 
literacy and marketing dimensions have on the uptake of health microinsurance (see Thornton 
et al., 2010, for a study on voluntary health insurance programs in Nicaragua). In particular, we 
examine the roles played by a lack of knowledge of these MHOs and a lack of financial literacy 
amongst locals. We also investigate the effect of marketing treatments that alleviate liquidity 
constraints. Whilst we initially intended to track individuals for several months after the end of 
the experiment in order to investigate re-enrolment and welfare issues, logistical problems 
prevented us from doing so. As a result, the sole focus is on the question of microinsurance 
uptake. 
 
We surveyed 360 randomly selected households across the city of Thiès, half of which were 
offered an insurance literacy training program. Independent of this assignment, all 360 
households were randomly selected to receive one of three marketing treatments. These took 
the form of redeemable vouchers offering different levels of reduction in MHO entry costs. We 
find that our various marketing treatments have a positive and significant effect on health 
insurance adoption, increasing take-up by approximately 35 - 40% for the sample as a whole. 
After interacting the marketing treatments with income, this effect appears more pronounced 
for poorer households, confirming the importance of liquidity constraints as a barrier to health 
microinsurance take-up. Conversely, the insurance literacy module does not seem to have a 
positive impact on take-up decisions. We attempt to provide different contextual reasons for 
these results, which indicate that liquidity constraints and not lack of information hinder 
demand. 
The next section elaborates on various reasons explaining low take-up rates in the context of 
our study. Section 3 presents the supply side of health microinsurance in Thiès. Section 4 
 
2 For a comprehensive review of the role of financial literacy in developed and developing countries see Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2014)  
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describes our experimental survey design and Section 5 presents descriptive statistics. Section 
6 introduces our empirical strategy, followed by a discussion of our results in Section 7. Section 
8 concludes. 
 
2 Explaining low take-up rates  
Our sample of 360 household heads shows that 33% have health insurance of various forms, 
for all or a fraction of their household members (on average 73% of all household members). 
The largest share (19%) represents households that have health insurance compulsorily 
provided by their employer in both public and private sectors. Only 3% of the households 
subscribe to a private health insurer, while MHO membership appears relatively modest at 11%. 
The next section elaborates on each of these health insurance products. In our sample, the main 
justifications mentioned for non-membership were linked to the following: lack of information 
about the products offered and their existence (55%); liquidity constraints (16%); lack of 
interest (5%); and lack of trust and confidence (2%). Our investigation focuses on what appears 
to be the two most important reasons at play, in our context, in explaining low take-up rates.3  
 
2.1 Lack of information 
Cai et al. (2009) highlight that many farmers in China refuse to purchase heavily subsidized 
insurance, partly due to the fact that some are unaware of the programs on offer. Jütting (2003), 
whose evidence is drawn from a rural region surrounding Thiès, notes that the concept of 
insurance is alien to a large proportion of people, suggesting that an information campaign 
might be useful in this respect. A related issue is the lack of knowledge and understanding of 
insurance principles (Chankova et al. 2008); referring to rainfall insurance in India, Giné et al. 
(2007) report that ‘the most common reason given by those interviewed was that they did not 
understand the product’. Limited understanding of rainfall insurance mechanisms in rural India 
is also highlighted by Cole et al. (2013), Gaurav et al. (2011) and Platteau and Ugarte Ontiveros 
(2013). Using a meta-analysis covering over 200 studies, Fernandes et al. (2014) find a limited 
impact of financial literacy interventions on financial behaviours, particularly in low-income 
samples.   
 
2.2 Liquidity constraints  
 
3 The literature on financial product take-up in developing countries also investigates the role of behavioural factors 
such as: loss aversion; aversion to contemplating adverse outcomes (Karlsson et al, 2009); prospect theory with narrow 
framing; limited attention (Karlan et al. 2010) and difficulties in evaluating low-probability events (Bbarseghyan et al. 
2013).  
5 
 
Whether poor populations can afford microinsurance schemes is a crucial question. Jütting 
(2003) finds that the poorest are represented in MHOs to a lesser extent than those with an 
average or high income. Chankova et al. (2008) find similar results using data from Ghana, 
Mali and Senegal. Giné et al. (2008) also show that take-up rates of rainfall insurance increases 
with household wealth in rural Andhra Pradesh. Whilst only 16% of our sample mentioned 
liquidity constraints as the reason for non-membership, it is also likely that individuals were 
reluctant to admit lack of funds to justify the fact that they were not members. This figure may 
thus be biased downward. 
 
2.3 Lack of Trust 
Trust can also play an important role in individual decision-making with regards insurance. Cai 
et al (2009) show that the very low take-up by Chinese farmers of a government sponsored 
insurance for sows may be explained, among other reasons, by the lack of trust toward 
governmental institutions. Cole et al. (2013) show that endorsement from a third party makes 
people 40% more likely to purchase rainfall insurance.  
 
Trust is likely to play an important role in both the sustainability of MHOs and their capacity 
to attract new members. Recent history in Thiès has shown that, in rare cases, some MHOs have 
ceased their activities or been temporarily unable to provide their members with insurance 
(Ferrera-Domingo (2002) lists some cases of defaulting MHOs). As claimed by Karlan (2005), 
answers on trust in General Social Surveys have predictive power on financial decisions such 
as repayment rates and saving patterns at the household level, and are a good proxy of the 
capacity to enter into binding relationships. A set of questions in our questionnaire were related 
to this issue; we asked individuals to weigh their trust on different items by putting aside 
marbles out of a maximum of ten on an increasing scale. Each answer was rescaled with regard 
to the trust given to the mother and the family respectively. For the sample of non-members 
who were aware of the existence of MHOs, we find that in both cases the median relative trust 
of MHOs given was eight out of ten. This suggests that these grassroots movements benefit 
from a largely positive a priori knowledge from locals and appear as trustworthy. This might 
explain why trust does not appear to be an important factor in explaining the low take-up rates 
observed. 
 
3 The supply side 
Health care in Thiès is organized according to a tiered system consisting of health huts (staffed 
by community health workers), health posts (staffed by nurses and certified midwives), and 
6 
 
health centres (staffed by medical doctors, nurses, and certified midwives). The health district 
of Thiès has one regional public hospital and one privately run mission hospital (St-Jean de 
Dieu). Data for this region shows that the ratio of inhabitants to health centres is seven times 
greater than WHO standards, but the ratio of inhabitants to health posts is in line with 
international norms (ANSD, 2008).  
 
In the absence of universal public health care, only three forms of health insurance are present 
in our sample. The first, and of relatively little importance, is offered by private insurers. They 
provide insurance according to different scales and often require their clients to open a saving 
account within their own institution (PAMECAS, etc.). The second type refers to compulsory 
insurance provided by employers with a minimum number of employees. Employees contribute 
a fraction of their wage to their firms’ health fund known as Institution de Prévoyance Maladie 
(IPM), which is then used for partial cover when health problems occur. Public servants have 
access to a more generous type of IPM where they, their spouse and often up to two children 
(under 18), are partially insured in case of health related expenditures. The third type consists 
of MHOs. Their appeal lies in the fact that they require the payment of affordable monthly 
premiums, mostly ranging from 200 to 500 CFA (0.30 to 0.76 Euro) per person covered.4 
MHOs are particularly attractive to the large numbers of self-employed and informal sector 
workers who have difficulty in accessing private insurance. Upon subscription, the household 
head pays a one time membership fee ranging from 1000 to 3000 CFA, which covers the 
registration cost. This includes receipt of a booklet listing all registered household members, 
which acts as an official document when visiting a health provider. The MHOs we surveyed 
did not operate any selection amongst potential candidates. The only screening involved takes 
the form of a ‘period of observation’, during which members are expected to pay individual 
premiums for three months, but are not entitled to make any claims. This three-month period is 
designed to minimise adverse selection by testing if new members can commit to a strict 
monthly schedule of contributions and prevents people from signing up for an MHO upon 
becoming sick. Any arrears on payments of premiums can lead to exclusion from coverage for 
that member. Whilst the rules are strict, the administrators of some MHOs have admitted to 
allowing a certain degree of flexibility. These not-for-profit grassroots schemes are managed 
by a non-remunerated governing body headed by a president and have written rules.  
 
4 Considering the average household size of 6.7 members, the household monthly premium should range from about 
1340 to 3350 CFA. This corresponds to a negligible share of household income (0.6 to 1.5%). Taken together, entry 
fees and a three month observation period for the average household may range from 5000 to 13000 CFA, a share 
ranging from 2.2 to 5.8% of average monthly household income.  
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The various MHOs in the city are relatively well spread out across its territory; thus most 
neighbourhoods have access to one. There is no obligation to join the closest MHO. Indeed, 
one can opt for any MHO. For these reasons, we consider distance to the headquarters of the 
closest MHO as unlikely to have explanatory power over uptake. Once insured by one of the 
three schemes described above, members can directly access specified health facilities and are 
required to pay a fraction of the fees. The remainder of the fees are covered by the insurer. At 
their core, such transactions have agreements (or conventions) negotiated between each 
respective health provider (huts, posts or the two centres) and MHO operating in Thiès. As such 
the agreement of the insurer, prior to a consultation or the treatment of a particular patient, is 
not required. The array of interventions covered and the extent of the coverage varies from one 
MHO to the next. However, they generally cover 25-75% of consultation costs and between 
50-100% of medical exams, hospitalizations, and various inpatient care fees at hospitals. 
 
As IPMs do not offer full coverage for consultation or inpatient care and do not cover all 
members of a household, there is ample scope to complement this coverage with that of an 
MHO. 18% of all households exposed to the marketing treatment (21 out of 117) responded 
positively, even if they already had a form of health insurance. This suggests the intention to 
either complement existing means of insurance or to cover additional members of the household, 
kin or both. In particular, of the 21 households, seven complemented an IPM insurance, 11 an 
existing MHO insurance and three another private form of health insurance. 
 
4 Experimental design 
In early 2010 we developed a partnership with GRAIM (Groupe recherche d’appui aux 
initiatives mutualistes), a Senegalese NGO promoting the work of local MHOs active in greater 
Thiès. As such, GRAIM acts as a regional coordinator and the intermediary for most MHOs in 
negotiating conventions with health providers. This partnership enabled us to draw on its 
knowledge to design and deliver our educational modules. Thiès was chosen for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it is one of the largest cities in Senegal with a population of about 240,000 
inhabitants. Secondly, some of the local MHOs are the oldest in Senegal, having been active 
for fifteen years; thus the city possesses a well-established supply of MHOs.  
 
We use data collected during the spring of 2010 on 360 randomly selected households across 
the whole territory covered by the city authorities, which represents an area of approximately 
20 square km. We sampled the number of surveyed households across all fifteen Thiès 
neighbourhoods according to their respective share of the overall population estimates (based 
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on the 2002 census). An official map of the city was used to select a number of streets spreading 
across each neighbourhood. Each street was assigned a number of households according to its 
length and density. For every street we used a pseudo-random process, by which every fifth lot 
according to a specific direction was picked. Since many households live on the same lot in 
semi-detached rooms, enumerators randomly selected one room by lot according to a clock-
wise selection varying from lot to lot. In the case where a lot was found empty or the head of 
household was not present, enumerators were instructed to set appointments and revisit the 
household later, otherwise the household was replaced.5 Given the small number of households 
sampled from such a relatively large area, we argue that spillovers within the sample are 
unlikely. 
 
Our baseline survey aimed to obtain information on individual and household characteristics, 
through a questionnaire administered to the household head, lasting about 40 minutes. No 
monetary compensation was offered for answering the questionnaire. We also gathered 
information from the household head concerning work, income, and a number of other factors 
which are described in greater detail below. In our context, and this can safely be extended to 
the broader national level, the husband is generally considered to be the breadwinner and the 
head of the house. As such, he is expected to provide insurance for the members of his 
household. This should provide ample justification as to why we collected these key variables 
affecting health insurance intake from the head. The data described and analysed below is thus 
at the household level.  
 
Treatments were randomly assigned at the household level. Selected households in each 
neighbourhood were listed sequentially and assigned, through a random number generator, to 
receive one of the six sub-treatments we detail below. We proceeded this way in order to avoid 
imbalances between our treatments within neighbourhoods. At the end of our first visit and after 
completion of the baseline questionnaire, households selected for the information session were 
invited to attend an insurance literacy module. Our information session was held on a non-
working day in the city centre, before our marketing treatment was implemented. Invitations 
were directly handed to heads of household. The module consisted of a three-hour educational 
presentation, offered by the GRAIM, on health microinsurance and specifically the functioning 
of MHOs (including the differences across various active MHOs in Thiès) and their origins in 
the region. A lesson on personal financial management which explored the notions of savings, 
 
5 Overall, 5 households did not want to participate in our study (1.4% of the targeted sample) and were replaced. 
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risk and insurance was also given. Case studies looking at health expenditures of different MHO 
members and non-member households were given in order to illustrate the different concepts 
introduced. Sessions were held in groups containing a maximum of 20 individuals at a time. 
GRAIM has been running a training program for several years for small communities eager to 
set up their own MHO and was therefore in an ideal position to run this module. It was slightly 
modified in order to be presented to randomly selected households. The same individual was in 
charge of running all the sessions, during which interactions with the participants were 
encouraged. Since the city covers a sizeable area, we reimbursed transportation costs for all 
individuals who had attended in order to minimize disincentives to attend. We gave 1000 CFA 
to every individual, which in Thiès, is the exact return fare for a taxi journey from any corner 
of the city to where the meetings were held.6 Households were informed that transportation 
costs would be covered at the time of the invitation. Phone calls to household heads were made 
a day or two before, to remind them of the educational session. The comparison group of 180 
households received nothing.  
 
After the insurance literacy training was completed, all households were shortly revisited and 
received a marketing treatment in the form of one out of three vouchers. The assignment of 
vouchers was orthogonal to the invitation to the educational session. The 360 households were 
split into three randomly chosen subsamples (of 120 households each) with each receiving an 
additional marketing treatment in the form of one of three vouchers. So for the 180 households 
invited to attend the insurance literacy module, 60 received voucher 1, 60 voucher 2 and 60 
voucher 3 (a similar distribution applies for the 180 households who did not receive an 
invitation to the module). Voucher 2 offered a full refund of membership fees in an MHO, 
which represented on average an amount of 1750 CFA (membership fees for the MHO joined 
by voucher holders ranged from 1000 to 3000 CFA). Voucher 3 provided a full refund of 
membership fees (equivalent to voucher 2) plus a refund of 250 CFA/month per new member 
covering fees linked to the observation period of three months (refunds were made for each new 
member for up to 3000 CFA, which is the equivalent of a three month premium for four people 
at 250 CFA/month). The refunds offered with vouchers 2 and 3 were such that respondents did 
not have to pay cash up front and then wait for a reimbursement. The vouchers actually reduced 
the initial cash outlay as these refunds were directly transferred to MHOs treasuries. Voucher 
 
6 We ensured, as much as we could, that the individuals who got their transportation reimbursed did actually pay for 
transport. We thus think that opportunism is unlikely to explain participation in the session (i.e. individuals attending just 
to obtain a little additional income).  
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1, a placebo treatment, had no monetary value attached, instead representing a simple invitation 
to the GRAIM in the event that the household was keen to know more about MHOs and the 
insurance products offered. The recipients of vouchers 2 and 3 had a period of two months to 
redeem the voucher by visiting the GRAIM and filling in an application form to join the MHO 
of their choice. Unfortunately, we could not collect information on how long households 
remained members following redemption of the voucher. Subscription is thus not measured in 
terms of how long they remained enrolled. 7  To ensure that our dependent variable was 
accurately constructed, we phoned all households who did not redeem their voucher one month 
after the redemption date to ask if, in the meantime, they had joined an MHO but not used their 
voucher. 
 
5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main socio-economic characteristics we consider in 
our study and which will be included in the empirical estimation below. The majority of 
household heads are male and live in a couple. The average household comprises over six 
members. 46% of heads attended secondary school or had higher levels of education (above six 
years of schooling). Household head’s income represents the sum of all sources of monthly 
income (labour income or wage, rent and received transfers). Due to the sensitivity of questions 
related to income, and the reticence to provide exact amounts, answers were in most cases (68% 
of all answers) collected according to intervals. An aggregated measure of income was 
constructed by adding the midpoint values for the ten income intervals, or exact values when 
given, to rents and transfers. From this, the mean of monthly head of household income is 
133591 CFA. We then categorized this variable into quintiles.8 We also computed a synthetic 
measure of durable assets owned by the households as a proxy for wealth. This represents the 
sum of a list of items comprising, amongst others, a series of kitchen and home appliances, 
mobile phone, bicycle, motorcycle, car, sewing machine, different pieces of furniture, etc. As a 
proxy for income stability, we use a dummy identifying if the head of household is working for 
a public institution. We also include a dummy for self-employed individuals (the benchmark 
group are employed by private firms).9 The intuition is that with respect to wages earned in 
 
7 This also means that we could not study the actual increase in access to and use of health services that MHO membership 
provided. 
8 Our results are robust to the use of an alternative variable, namely household’s income. This was similarly computed 
by adding spouse’s income (mean of 222340 CFA). 
9 Our results hold if we use a single dummy variable regrouping all formal sector employees, working in either the private 
or public sector. 
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informal activities (petty retailing, craftsmen, transport, etc.), public servants and formal 
employees of the private sector are likely to have a steadier stream of income and thus find it 
easier to commit to the payment of monthly premiums. Around 20% of heads in our sample 
work for the state. We also use dummy variables to measure if households were using one of 
three saving devices: ROSCAs, banks, or microfinance institutions. Access to a savings device 
might help a household to buffer health shocks by alleviating credit constraints, thus rendering 
MHOs less attractive. Alternatively, having access to savings may help households pay for 
membership fees and premiums, making MHO membership more feasible. Furthermore, being 
a member of a ROSCA might imply some discipline in saving which could in turn help an 
individual to commit to an MHO’s premiums. With regard to the health status of the household, 
67% of heads reported one of their household members having been sick in the previous twelve 
months. More sickness is likely to lead to greater demand for health care and hence for health 
insurance.10 The mean of health-related monthly expenditure for a household is 8320 CFA, 
which represents around 3.7% of mean household income. We measure baseline knowledge of 
insurance and its basic concepts as a score given by the sum of correct answers to a series of 
seven true or false questions on the nature of insurance.11 We then create two dummies for 
different levels of knowledge: Low insurance knowledge (score from 0 to 2) and high insurance 
knowledge (3 to 7).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
A set of questions in our questionnaire were related to trust, risk and time preferences. We asked 
individuals to weigh their trust on different items by setting aside marbles, out of a maximum 
of ten, on an increasing scale. Each answer was rescaled with regard to the trust given to the 
mother and the family respectively. For the sample of non-members who were aware of the 
existence of MHOs, we find that in both cases the median relative trust on MHOs given was 
eight out of ten. This tends to show that these grassroots movements benefit from a largely 
 
10 Some empirical studies focusing on developed countries show that advantageous selection into health insurance may 
arise as a consequence of higher preventive care (Fang et al, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, the majority of studies 
have not found such a phenomenon in developing contexts, where adverse selection appears to be a problem for health 
microinsurance programs (Wang et al., 2006; Spenkuch, 2012), although Banerjee et al. (2014) is a notable exception. 
11 The seven questions are: 1. Is the insurance premium reimbursed if one does not get sick? 2. Does the insurer make 
expenses just in case of sickness? 3. In case of sickness can one member consult a health provider at reduced prices, as 
the insurer covers part of the fees? 4. If insured, can one receive a payment in case of death? 5. Can the insurer help 
repaying any sorts of loans? 6. If I am not insured and I get sick, am I in charge of all healthcare expenditure relating to 
that illness? 7. If I have health insurance, do I start receiving money after one year?  
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positive a priori knowledge from locals and appear as trustworthy. 12  We measure risk 
preferences through a variable which takes a value of one if the household head is strongly risk 
averse (which is the case for 56% of them), i.e. always opted for the certain outcome when 
presented with a set of hypothetical choices between gambles and certain gains and losses, using 
a similar methodology as Voors et al. (2012). Each individual had to choose between certain 
outcomes (gain/loss of 200, 250 and 300 CFA) and simple gambles with probability 1/4 to 
win/lose 1000 CFA and probability 3/4 to win/lose nothing. We ran this exercise with the same 
amounts multiplied by a factor of ten. We also turned to the methodology put forward in Voors 
et al. (2012) to elicit discount factors. In this case, from a list of different hypothetical amounts 
to be received in one month, household heads had to choose the one that would make them 
indifferent from receiving 10000 CFA francs today. The list of amounts used in this question is 
as follows: 10500, 11000, 12500, 15000, 17500, 20000, 25000 and 30000 CFA, representing 
the following discount factors at one month: 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%, 150% and 200% 
respectively. We then generated a binary variable taking the value of one when the individual 
belonged to the more patient half of our sample. 
 
Table 1 also shows univariate tests for random assignments of treatments across samples. 
Randomization with respect to voucher assignment appears satisfactory. However, a number of 
significant differences appear between treatment and control regarding invitation to the literacy 
module. Household heads that were not invited to the module are on average richer (a smaller 
proportion in the first quintile of income and larger proportion in the fourth quintile) and 
wealthier, according to the number of durables owned. Non-invited individuals also appear to 
be significantly more likely to be employed by a public institution and more knowledgeable 
about insurance and its basic concepts. Finally, the subsample of non-invitees is significantly 
better insured against health expenditures (through MHOs, IPMs, etc.). Even when we consider 
the large number of tests and use Bonferroni correction, Already insured, Highest insurance 
knowledge, Durables and 1st Income quintile remain significantly different (at 10%) between 
treated and control across the invitation dimension. The reason that we observe these and the 
reason why our design gave those results is unclear to us. There was no difference in the refusal 
rate to participate in the study by treatment. To the best of our knowledge, none of our 
enumerators displayed strategic behaviour in selecting households and the assignment of 
 
12 Given that we have a measure of trust only for the subsample of non-members aware of the existence of MHOs we 
did not include this variable in our regression models. It would have significantly reduced the size of our sample for 
estimation. 
 
13 
 
treatments was conducted in a proper fashion that should have prevented this outcome. When 
turning to balance checks in a multivariate framework where treatment variables are regressed 
on all relevant observable characteristics (see Appendix A, Table A1; all our appendices are 
available online through the journal website), most of the imbalances registered in the univariate 
framework vanish. Some concerns remain though: the likelihood of being invited to the 
education session is significantly linked (at 10%) to being already insured and less wealthy 
(measured by the variable ‘durables’). 
 
Table 2 decomposes uptake according to the educational and marketing treatments. One notices 
that our compliance rate for the educational treatment is relatively low; only 105 out of the 180 
(58%) invited actually attended the module. It also shows that, for the subsample of households 
invited to the module, the difference in terms of uptake between those who attended the 
insurance literacy training and those who did not is negligible (24 versus 17). The table shows 
that voucher 1 had almost no impact on increasing uptake, with 89 out of 91 new uptakes being 
generated by either voucher 2 or 3. It is also interesting to note that 21 of the 91 who took 
insurance already possessed some health insurance (11 MHO, 7 IPM and 3 private insurers), 
indicating that MHO membership can complement current health insurance by covering 
additional members or by topping up existing insurance.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
6 Empirical specification 
To assess the impact of our two different treatments we use the following model  
𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟2𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟3𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 
where Uptake is a dummy variable taking the value one if the household subscribes to an MHO 
following one of our treatments. A household, indexed by the subscript i, subscribes if it 
redeems its voucher. To ensure that our dependent variable was accurately constructed, we 
phoned all households who did not redeem their voucher one month after the redemption date 
to ask if, in the meantime, they had joined an MHO but not used their voucher. This allowed us 
to account for the membership of two additional households. Invited is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the household was invited to the insurance literacy module. Voucher 2 (3) is a 
dummy variable equaling one if the household was given voucher 2 (or voucher 3). X’ is a 
vector of other covariates including household heads’ characteristics (gender, education, 
income, and employment status), an indicator of household wealth, two proxies for the status 
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of the household’s health, the household’s level of insurance literacy and risk and time 
preferences.  
 
The coefficients of interest are α, δ1 and δ2, which measure the effects on the probability of 
joining an MHO, of being invited to attend the educational module and of receiving either 
voucher 2 or voucher 3. In this context, α measures the intention-to-treat effect in the reduced 
form. Because the compliance rate was not perfect (58% of people invited accepted the offer of 
insurance literacy training) we also estimate the average treatment effect of insurance literacy 
on the probability of take-up using IV in a structural model. Given that households self-select 
in attending the training session, it becomes necessary to correct for such a problem. Random 
assignment to the education module is used as an instrument for attending the module (first 
stage). The latter is then used to estimate the treatment on the treated effect (second stage). To 
investigate the role of liquidity constraints on health microinsurance take-up, we examine 
heterogeneous effects. In particular, we interact the marketing treatment variable (grouping 
both voucher 2 and 3) with income quintiles. 
 
Given our small sample and the imbalance between treated and control groups across the 
‘Invited to the education session’ dimension, we reweight the observations of our control 
subsample in order to perfectly balance covariate distributions in the treated and control groups 
along the first three sample moments (i.e. mean, variance and skewness), using entropy 
balancing (carried out using the ‘ebalance’ stata routine). A brief description and theoretical 
details of the procedure are supplied in Appendix A. Table A2 shows how the differences 
between treated and control groups disappear along the first three sample moments after 
applying this reweighting technique on all the variables used in our regressions. Regression 
tables 3 and 4 are presented after rebalancing has been carried out (Appendices B and C show 
the results without rebalancing). Both sets of tables show that none of the results, with regards 
the treatments, depend on reweighting the sample or multiple hypothesis testing. 
 
7 Results and discussion 
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 3 display the results of our ordinary least squares (OLS) model on the 
probability of take-up while columns 4 to 6 exhibit the same specifications estimated by 2SLS 
where presence at the education session is instrumented by being invited. It should be noted 
that the F statistics, used to identify the power of an instrument, deliver such high values that 
weak instruments do not to be an issue. Columns 1 and 4 keep the controls to a minimum, 
columns 2 and 5 add basic independent variables while columns 3 and 6 present results with 
15 
 
the full set of control variables. Results obtained (not shown) with a Probit model are similar. 
All regressions show that being either invited to or present at the educational module does not 
increase the likelihood of taking up microinsurance. They also clearly display that both 
vouchers significantly increase microinsurance uptake, by 38 and 48 percentage points 
respectively. This corresponds to a 216% increase with respect to the situation at the baseline. 
The coefficients of these variables are not significantly different from each other. The 
significant, positive and sizeable effect of our voucher treatments seem in line with the trend of 
the literature on formal insurance in developing countries, where take-up does not skyrocket 
even after generous subsidies. For example, Cole et al. (2013) find that even when an index 
insurance policy was so highly subsidized as to yield an expected return of up to 181%, only 
half of the households offered the policy purchased it. In Thornton et al. (2010), a sub-sample 
of households offered a 6-month health insurance subsidy, worth US$96, were 33% more likely 
to enrol on the insurance program. Banerjee et al. (2014), found that bundling health 
microinsurance with microcredit led to a decrease in take-up. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE  
 
Neither the intention-to-treat (column 1 and 2) nor the treatment on the treated (column 4) 
effects of insurance literacy training are significant. This result is only slightly surprising given 
that only 55% of all 360 households noted a lack of information and knowledge was the reason 
they had not joined an MHO. Indeed, it could be that insurance literacy was already sufficiently 
high and that most people we invited to the training grasped the basic concepts and the need for 
health microinsurance. 51% of the heads randomly invited to attend the module had mentioned 
dearth of information as the reason explaining their lack of membership; only 58% of these 
actually attended. Several other reasons may explain the lack of a significant effect in our 
context. It could also be that the product offered by MHOs is simple enough to understand 
without the need for training. Gaurav et al. (2011) found that their educational module treatment 
on rainfall insurance in Gujarat in India improved uptake by just 8% and was thus not 
considered to be a cost-effective marketing tool. With data from the same country, Giné et al. 
(2007) emphasize the role of insurance literacy for rainfall insurance take-up. The complexity 
of rainfall insurance makes it more likely to benefit from an insurance literacy module. 
However this remains debatable, as Cole et al. (2013) find no significant effect (and surprisingly 
negative coefficients) of attending an educational module on rainfall insurance uptake in India.  
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The quality of the educational module could also have played a role. In this regard, we did not 
test participants’ financial literacy after their exposure to the module and are thus unable to 
formally test the effect of this. However, we know that the person in charge of organizing the 
module had been running several dozen similar programs over recent years and was a senior 
member of staff at GRAIM. Moreover, our compliance rate was relatively low: only 58% of 
people invited turned up to the offer of insurance literacy training. We discuss this issue in 
greater detail below. For most households, the head attended the information sessions. However, 
even if (s)he is convinced by the benefits, this does not necessarily translate into membership 
as (s)he may have relatively little bargaining power within the household.  
 
The lack of significance from the information treatment might also indicate that expectations 
about the product were overly optimistic and that once the details and fees were known, such 
insurance became clearly uninteresting or unaffordable. Such results can also be found in 
Thornton et al. (2010) who study a voluntary health insurance program for informal sector 
workers in Nicaragua, finding that a treatment involving the distribution of an informational 
brochure alone reduces the likelihood of enrolment in the insurance program by five percentage 
points relative to the control group which received nothing. Cole et al. (2011) offers ﬁnancial 
subsidies among the unbanked in Indonesia, which signiﬁcantly increased the share of 
households that opened a bank savings account within the subsequent 2 months. They also offer 
an orthogonal treatment providing a financial literacy module, which has no effect on the 
likelihood of opening a bank savings account for their overall sample. Another reason that could 
explain our result is the fact that around a quarter of the households invited, a non-negligible 
share, already had health insurance before attending. 
 
It is worth mentioning that our computations show that our test for α could detect expected 
effect size at the design phase (of 10-15%) with power well above the widely considered 
satisfactory threshold of 70%. For size effects comparable to the one we have for voucher 2, 
our power is above 95%. Tables D1 and D2 in Appendix D show that for both the coefficients 
of invited to the education session and vouchers our results offer convincing evidence to 
indicate that our sample size calculation was powered to detect statistically significant 
differences from the various groups. 
 
Despite these results, we do not claim that information is of little importance if one wants to 
increase MHO membership and the uptake of health microinsurance. Information may be more 
likely to have a significant impact if it is targeted towards the neediest and in different contexts. 
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What we wish to highlight is that for the cost it represents, such informational sessions, at least 
in our context, appear to be less cost-effective in increasing uptake than voucher 2 (and 3). An 
invitation to the information module represents three types of costs: transportation costs of 1000 
CFAF, a small fee for distributing the invitation (around 100 CFAF per household) and costs 
of about 500 CFAF per attendee to pay for the individual in charge of running the module, 
making an overall cost of 1600 CFAF per household. Voucher 2 costs on average 1750 CFAF 
for membership fees alongside some minimal fees for voucher distribution (around 100 CFAF 
per household), making an overall cost of around 1850 CFAF per household. When compared, 
the impact of voucher 2 is greater than twice the absolute value of the impact of the 
informational session for less than twice its cost.  Given that the effects of voucher 2 and 3 are 
not statistically different, we can conclude that removing the entry fees to MHO subscription is 
the most cost-effective treatment among those considered.  
 
We henceforth highlight other results of interest in Table 3.13 Households whose heads have 
attended only primary school seem to be significantly less likely to join an MHO than those 
who have attended secondary school. Households from the first four income quintiles are 
significantly more likely to take-up MHO insurance than the richest households (the benchmark 
group is the richest quintile). This result is not in line with other related papers on the 
determinants of participation in MHOs (notably Jütting, 2003 and Jowett, 2003). The poorest 
do not appear to be excluded from subscribing to an MHO and the richest are likely to use other 
means to insure themselves (private insurer, own funds, etc.). This result is also consistent with 
the fact that liquidity constraints were only mentioned by 16% of the households surveyed in 
explaining lack of membership. However, whether a head of household is self-employed or 
works as a public servant, has no significant impact (the benchmark group is to be employed 
by a private firm). This appears to indicate that the stability of one’s source of income is an 
irrelevant factor. Male headed households, as well as bigger households, are more likely to join 
MHOs. We also included a dummy variable already insured which takes the value one if the 
head has health insurance (IPM, MHO or private). Although, this variable appears to exhibit a 
negative sign in the two models presented, in most cases it is not statistically significant, with 
the exception of some of the regressions on the rebalanced sample where it is significant at the 
10%.14 This conveys that, conditional on the other factors, already being insured decreases the 
 
13 Given that we have a measure of trust only for the subsample of non-members aware of the existence of MHOs, we did 
not include this variable in our model. It would have significantly reduced the size of our sample for estimation. 
14 Our main results hold if we restrict the sample to those without insurance at the baseline. 
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likelihood of taking up microinsurance on average but also that enough individuals in this 
situation still join MHOs for the coefficient to be mostly insignificant. This reflects the 
discussion at the end of section 3. Indeed, most IPMs, MHOs and private insurers do not offer 
full coverage for consultation and inpatient care fees and do not cover all members of a 
household, leaving some scope to complement this coverage with that of an MHO. Other market 
imperfections such as credit constraints can contract poor households’ demand for 
microinsurance. In this respect, we use the dummy saving device (taking the value one if the 
households are using one of three saving devices: ROSCAs, banks or microfinance institutions), 
which allows us to measure the impact of having access to financial institutions that can 
alleviate credit constraints on microinsurance uptake. Our results show that this variable has no 
significant impact. Neither does our proxy for wealth. These two results seem to indicate that 
credit constraints do not represent an important obstacle to uptake.15 It is also interesting to note 
that, with respect to membership fees and monthly contributions, the vast majority of the groups 
that we encountered allowed their members some flexibility. Members can pay in delayed 
instalments, which may attenuate liquidity and credit constraints. Another noteworthy, and 
expected, result pertains to the highly significant and negative coefficient on the No insurance 
knowledge dummy(in the rebalanced sample), testifying that those who do not understand the 
principles of health insurance are less likely to join an MHO. Finally, in a region prone to 
various chronic and recurrent infections such as malaria, it was expected that households that 
contain unhealthy members would be more likely to join an MHO. However, the results indicate 
that households that reported recent episode of sickness (measured by the variable reported 
sickness, which takes the value one for a household where one of its members has suffered from 
any kind of sickness in the previous twelve months) were not more likely to join MHOs. This 
suggests that adverse selection is not likely to be an issue in the context of this study.  
Neither the risk aversion nor the time preference variables appear to significantly influence 
uptake of our microinsurance product. This result is robust to different definitions of time and 
risk preferences. For risk preferences we consider the subsamples of risk-averse agents (always 
opting for the certain amount) for small and large stakes, for gains and losses. For time 
preferences we employ different time horizons and stakes, namely we elicit two days, two 
weeks, one month and six month discount factors for small (1000 CFA) and large (10000 CFA) 
stakes and construct a dummy taking the value of one when the individual belonged to the more 
 
15 Our sample shows that 33% of household heads tried to borrow from the formal sector in the past and the vast majority 
of them (94%) obtained the desired loan. Our data also show that it is the relatively richer households who attempted to 
get a loan. Nevertheless, it shows that, to a certain extent, credit is available in Thies. 
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patient half of our sample. The coefficients were not statistically significant in any combination 
of the time and risk variables.16  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 presents the results of heterogeneous effects, through interacted variable regressions. 
The first column presents the interaction between income quintiles and both voucher 2 and 3 
combined (the variable voucher takes value one if an individual received either voucher 2 or 3). 
These results suggest that liquidity constraints are likely to be binding for the poorer and a 
barrier to health microinsurance take-up. While our marketing treatments are likely to constitute 
a negligible share of income for the richest households, therefore not impacting their take-up 
decision, they clearly matter for the poorest households’ decision. When the educational module 
is interacted with the marketing treatment (voucher) and insurance knowledge we find no 
significant heterogenous effect on the uptake, as confirmed by columns 2 and 3. The marginal 
effects of the interactions with the education session are never statistically significant and do 
not bring additional effects with regard to uptake.17 Other regressions, not presented, interacting 
income and insurance knowledge corroborate the story that vouchers and income seem to drive 
most of the effect. Vouchers 2 and 3 combined have a strong and significant impact on 
microinsurance uptake, this effect being statistically significant for the poorest individuals in 
the sample. We also found that the marginal effects (not shown) of the interactions of the level 
of education (the dummies head attended primary school and head attended secondary school 
or more) with the education session are insignificant. It should also be noted that these results 
do not depend on the particular features of our randomization exercise, since our main results 
hold with and without rebalancing the control sample. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Table 5 shows the determinants of attendance at the educational module. The independent 
variables include all control variables from table 4 except voucher which was distributed after 
the training was completed. As discussed above, only 105 of 180 invited households (58%) 
attended the educational module. This is despite the fact that invitations were directly handed 
 
16 Results are not shown, but are available upon request. 
17 Given the relatively large number of hypotheses we test, we also applied Bonferroni corrections to all our regressions. 
All results from Table 3 and most results from Table 4 (all those concerning voucher, and the first two quintiles of income) 
remain. Since Bonferroni corrections are known to be overly conservative, not taking account of the correlation between 
outcomes, we can prescribe a high level of confidence to our results. 
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to heads of household and we followed them up by calling to further advertise the module. The 
results suggest that two variables are consistently significant in explaining participation in the 
educational module, namely being among the poorest members of our sample (first income 
quintile) and owning durables. We find that the variables related to head’s employment type, 
income, household’s size and health status are insignificant. Insurance knowledge seems to be 
mostly insignificant in explaining attendance at the educational session, with the exception of 
the dummy regarding 'no insurance knowledge' which is significant at the 10% level in one of 
four models. 
 
We also examine the determinants of which MHO new subscribers decided to join. There seems 
to be no pattern between household characteristics, the voucher received (either 2 or 3) and 
whether or not they were invited to (attended) the education module, with the MHOs they 
decided to join in terms of membership fees, premiums and coverage. This partially comes from 
the fact that the MHOs selected are relatively similar. A discussion related to this issue is 
provided in Appendix E. 
 
8 Conclusion 
We offered a customized insurance literacy module communicating the benefits arising from 
personal health insurance and explaining the functioning of MHOs to randomly selected 
households in the city of Thiès. We simultaneously measured the effect of three cross-cutting 
marketing treatments using a randomized controlled trial.  
 
Our findings reveal that the insurance literacy module had no significant impact on health 
insurance take-up, while our marketing treatments have a large and positive significant impact 
on the households’ purchase decisions, a result that holds in both the original and reweighted 
samples.  What appears from various descriptive statistics and results from an econometric 
analysis, is that the key element driving new membership is the allocation of either voucher 2 
or 3. This is particularly the case for the poorer households, who are more likely to be liquidity 
constrained. Crudely interpreted, these results suggest that what really matters is not education, 
but rather compensation in the form of reduced fees for membership and the period of 
observation. Should the state or the city authorities wish to increase take-up rates, the most 
efficient way would be to alleviate liquidity constraints and the financial barriers to entry by 
offering a subsidy akin to voucher 2. This voucher is significantly less costly than voucher 3, 
but shows a similar impact on uptake. If information is to be provided, it would have to be 
targeted and given more conveniently. We nevertheless remain cautious of such results by 
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emphasising that they are based on a relatively small sample. Unfortunately, our study does not 
touch upon the critical issue of membership sustainability over time once membership has been 
acquired. 
 
MHOs could represent a unique way to reach relatively poor people and informal workers who 
do not have access to an IPM. The networks they represent in such districts should be considered 
a serious asset. Because they are well established and experienced institutions, there is  potential 
to reach underprivileged households at a relatively low cost.  
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Table 1 Random Assignment of Treatments, univariate tests 
  
Whole 
Sample Not Invited Invited  Voucher 1   Voucher 2 Voucher 3  
  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Difference Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. F-test* 
Head is male 0.733 0.443 0.75 0.434 0.717 0.452 0.033 0.758 0.43 0.7 0.46 0.748 0.436 0.51 
Head lives in couple 0.817 0.387 0.844 0.363 0.789 0.409 0.056 0.792 0.408 0.825 0.382 0.84 0.368 0.65 
Head attended  primary school 0.2 0.401 0.2 0.401 0.2 0.401 0 0.166 0.374 0.215 0.412 0.218 0.415 0.62 
Head attended sec. school or more 0.461 0.499 0.489 0.501 0.433 0.497 0.056 0.517 0.502 0.4 0.492 0.471 0.501 1.56 
Household size 6.731 3.212 6.533 2.903 6.928 3.49 -0.394 7.1 3.46 6.35 3.143 6.748 3.009 1.61 
Already insured 0.325 0.469 0.406 0.492 0.244 0.431 0.161** 0.358 0.482 0.3 0.46 0.319 0.468 0.43 
No insurance knowledge 0.525 0.500 0.483 0.501 0.567 0.497 -0.083 0.475 0.04 0.57 0.079 0.529 0.079 1.1 
Intermediate insurance knowledge 0.100 0.300 0.056 0.23 0.144 0.353 -0.089*** 0.133 0.014 0.083 0.028 0.084 0.029 1.109 
Highest insurance knowledge 0.375 0.485 0.461 0.5 0.289 0.455 0.172*** 0.392 0.037 0.347 0.074 0.387 0.075 0.304 
Head is public employed 0.197 0.398 0.233 0.424 0.161 0.369 0.072* 0.208 0.408 0.2 0.402 0.185 0.39 0.09 
Head is self employed 0.428 0.495 0.433 0.497 0.422 0.495 0.011 0.425 0.496 0.413 0.494 0.445 0.499 0.13 
Durables 6.597 3.109 7.078 3.262 6.117 2.878 0.961*** 6 717 3 131 6 358 2 961 6 731 3 251 0.53 
1st Income  quintile 0.203 0.403 0.139 0.347 0.283 0.452 -0.144*** 0.208 0.408 0.217 0.414 0.202 0.403 0.15 
2nd Income quintile 0.247 0.432 0.244 0.431 0.239 0.428 0.006 0.233 0.425 0.242 0.43 0.244 0.431 0 
3rd Income quintile 0.172 0.378 0.161 0.369 0.178 0.383 -0.017 0.142 0.35 0.167 0.374 0.202 0.403 0.67 
4th Income quintile 0.178 0.383 0.222 0.417 0.133 0.341 0.089** 0.217 0.414 0.167 0.374 0.16 0.368 0.73 
5th Income quintile 0.200 0.401 0.233 0.424 0.167 0.374 0.067 0.2 0.402 0.208 0.408 0.193 0.397 0.04 
Saving device 0.569 0.496 0.617 0.488 0.522 0.501 0.094* 0.6 0.492 0.525 0.501 0.588 0.494 0.73 
Reported sickness 0.669 0.471 0.7 0.46 0.639 0.482 0.061 0.675 0.47 0.658 0.476 0.681 0.468 0.07 
Strongly risk averse 0.561 0.497 0.567 0.497 0.555 0.498 0.011 0.608 0.49 0.479 0.502 0.596 0.493 2.50* 
Patient 0.414 0.493 0.383 0.487 0.444 0.498 -0.061 0.391 0.49 0.463 0.501 0.386 0.489 0.9 
MHO take-up 0.253 0.435 0.227 0.42 0.277 0.449 -0.05 0.017 0.128 0.314 0.467 0.528 0.497 33.78*** 
N 360   180   180     120   121   119     
Notes: Column “Difference” reports the difference between Not Invited and Invited. Column “F-test” reports the values of a test of joint significance of the coefficients of a regression with the row 
variable as explanatory and dummies for vouchers as regressors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2 Uptake Distribution across Treatments 
 
N Take-up (n) 
Take-up 
rate %  (n / N) 
Take-up rate %   
(n / 360)  
Already had some form of 
insurance 117 21 18 6 
MHO members 37 11 30 3 
IPM members 69 7 10 2 
Private insurance 11 3 27 1 
Educational treatment     
Invited to Educational Session 180 41 23 11 
Attendants 105 24 23 7 
of which already insured 27 6 22 2 
Non-Attendants 74 17 23 5 
of which already insured 17 4 24 1 
Not Invited to Educational 
Session 180 50 28 14 
of which already insured 73 11 15 3 
Marketing treatments     
Voucher 1 120 2 2 1 
of which already insured 43 0 0 0 
Voucher 2 121 38 31 11 
of which already insured 36 8 22 2 
Voucher 3 119 51 43 14 
of which already insured 38 13 34 4 
Voucher 2+3 240 89 37 25 
of which already insured 74 21 28 6 
Whole Sample (#obs) 360 91 25 25 
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Table 3 Determinants of Insurance Take-up (Rebalanced sample) 
Dependent variable =1 if a household (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
subscribes to an MHO OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Invited to the education session -0.0529 -0.0529 -0.0529    
 (0.0682) (0.0563) (0.0470)    
Present at the education session    -0.0907 -0.0907 -0.0907 
    (0.117) (0.0936) (0.0769) 
Voucher 2 0.339*** 0.399*** 0.378*** 0.334*** 0.394*** 0.373*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0643) (0.0560) (0.0726) (0.0619) (0.0534) 
Voucher 3 0.413*** 0.478*** 0.482*** 0.411*** 0.476*** 0.480*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0625) (0.0584) (0.0678) (0.0594) (0.0553) 
1st income quintile  0.244*** 0.339***  0.256*** 0.361*** 
  (0.0796) (0.0880)  (0.0801) (0.0888) 
2nd income quintile  0.307*** 0.348***  0.308*** 0.354*** 
  (0.0799) (0.0849)  (0.0777) (0.0821) 
3rd income quintile  0.118 0.187**  0.124 0.197** 
  (0.0867) (0.0824)  (0.0840) (0.0779) 
4th income quintile  0.189** 0.188**  0.188** 0.190** 
  (0.0814) (0.0828)  (0.0785) (0.0786) 
Male  0.133* 0.145**  0.132** 0.145** 
  (0.0679) (0.0645)  (0.0653) (0.0612) 
Age  -0.000381 -0.000574  -0.000439 -0.000652 
  (0.00200) (0.00215)  (0.00194) (0.00204) 
Household size  0.0140* 0.0140*  0.0142* 0.0140* 
  (0.00800) (0.00789)  (0.00774) (0.00752) 
Head attended primary school  -0.114 -0.154**  -0.118* -0.159** 
  (0.0703) (0.0724)  (0.0695) (0.0707) 
Head attended secondary or more  0.0192 -0.00658  0.0152 -0.0142 
  (0.0763) (0.0742)  (0.0733) (0.0704) 
Already insured   -0.120*   -0.114* 
   (0.0728)   (0.0691) 
No knowledge of insurance   -0.247***   -0.239*** 
   (0.0877)   (0.0841) 
Highest knowledge of insurance   -0.0201   -0.0194 
   (0.101)   (0.0969) 
Head has public employment   -0.0322   -0.0319 
   (0.0797)   (0.0754) 
Head is self-employed   0.0252   0.0209 
   (0.0550)   (0.0523) 
Durables   0.0148   0.0168 
   (0.0115)   (0.0109) 
Savings device   0.0757   0.0812 
   (0.0595)   (0.0578) 
Reported sickness over the year   -0.0679   -0.0699 
   (0.0588)   (0.0561) 
Strongly risk averse   -0.00628   -0.0102 
   (0.0549)   (0.0527) 
Impatient   -0.0475   -0.0455 
   (0.0569)   (0.0549) 
Constant 0.0304 -0.589*** -0.477 0.0327 -0.579*** -0.498* 
 (0.0349) (0.171) (0.299) (0.0378) (0.166) (0.288) 
       F Stat    248.5 *** 227.6 *** 234 *** 
Neighourhood Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 
R-squared 0.174 0.332 0.408 0.166 0.326 0.402 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Heterogeneous effects (Rebalanced sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
Invited to the education 
session 
-0.0205 
(0.0449) 
-0.0349 
(0.0467) 
-0.0543 
(0.0604) 
-0.0205 
(0.0457) 
-0.0191 
(0.0540) 
-0.0205 
(0.0459) 
Voucher 0.180** 0.375*** 0.385*** 0.370*** 0.386*** 0.399*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0651) (0.0427) (0.0543) (0.0424) (0.0495) 
1st income quintile * 
Voucher 
0.221* 
(0.113) 
     
2nd income quintile * 
Voucher 
0.361*** 
(0.105) 
     
3rd income quintile * 
Voucher 
0.170 
(0.131) 
     
4th income quintile * 
Voucher 
0.155 
(0.143) 
     
Invited to education 
session * Voucher 
 0.0217 
(0.0796) 
    
Invited to the module * 
High insurance 
knowledge 
  0.0823 
(0.107) 
   
Voucher * High 
insurance knowledge 
   0.0373 
(0.0863) 
  
Invited to education 
session * Already 
insured 
    -0.00533 
(0.110) 
 
Voucher * Already 
insured 
     -0.0610 
(0.0882) 
1st income quintile 0.112 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 
 (0.0843) (0.0794) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0802) (0.0801) 
2nd income quintile 0.0677 0.332*** 0.337*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0726) (0.0775) (0.0769) (0.0777) (0.0781) (0.0782) 
3rd income quintile 0.0838 0.202*** 0.206*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 
 (0.0879) (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0761) (0.0771) (0.0765) 
4th income quintile 0.0804 0.199*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0832) (0.0742) (0.0751) (0.0747) (0.0755) (0.0737) 
Already insured -0.0606 -0.0540 -0.0484 -0.0542 -0.0503 -0.0115 
 (0.0692) (0.0717) (0.0734) (0.0714) (0.0977) (0.0706) 
High insurance 
knowledge 
0.137** 
(0.0618) 
0.136** 
(0.0613) 
0.0883 
(0.0955) 
0.111* 
(0.0606) 
0.135** 
(0.0615) 
0.136** 
(0.0611) 
       
Controls + 
Neighbourhood Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 
R-squared 0.327 0.313 0.315 0.313 0.313 0.314 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Determinants of participation in the educational module 
Dependent variable =1 if a household (1) (2) (3) (4) 
participated in the educational session OLS OLS Probit Probit 
1st income quintile 0.331** 0.366*** 0.343*** 0.409*** 
 (0.132) (0.136) (0.109) (0.110) 
2nd income quintile 0.0848 0.0540 0.0986 0.0619 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.139) (0.152) 
3rd income quintile 0.161 0.0750 0.176 0.0753 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.123) (0.141) 
4th income quintile 0.0186 -0.0227 0.0300 -0.0134 
 (0.145) (0.153) (0.140) (0.158) 
Male -0.0531 0.0227 -0.0594 0.0491 
 (0.0948) (0.0927) (0.0983) (0.109) 
Age -0.00155 -0.00287 -0.00182 -0.00352 
 (0.00323) (0.00351) (0.00337) (0.00376) 
Household size -0.000509 0.000499 0.000137 0.00103 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0130) 
Head attended primary school -0.0270 -0.119 -0.0290 -0.159 
 (0.105) (0.109) (0.111) (0.124) 
Head attended secondary or more -0.109 -0.168 -0.120 -0.228* 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.111) (0.118) 
Already insured 0.123 0.140 0.125 0.151 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) 
No knowledge of insurance 0.185 0.177 0.195* 0.201 
 (0.114) (0.119) (0.117) (0.126) 
Highest knowledge of insurance 0.0843 0.0556 0.0833 0.0625 
 (0.129) (0.133) (0.126) (0.136) 
Head has public employment -0.0238 0.0330 -0.0356 0.0234 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.126) (0.129) 
Head is self-employed -0.0387 -0.0182 -0.0461 -0.0362 
 (0.0889) (0.0913) (0.0922) (0.101) 
Durables 0.0324** 0.0409** 0.0375** 0.0510*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0193) 
Savings device 0.0763 0.0492 0.0925 0.0831 
 (0.0829) (0.0878) (0.0881) (0.0964) 
Reported sickness over the year -0.0746 -0.0582 -0.0871 -0.0703 
 (0.0790) (0.0868) (0.0817) (0.0926) 
Strongly risk averse -0.0402 -0.0141 -0.0499 -0.0417 
 (0.0754) (0.0947) (0.0788) (0.100) 
Impatient 0.0844 0.0313 0.0924 0.0355 
 (0.0791) (0.0952) (0.0803) (0.0973) 
Constant 0.457 0.330   
 (0.286) (0.370)   
     
Neighbourhood Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 180 180 180 177 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.121 0.204 0.097 0.164 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note that 3 observations are lost in column (4) due to one of the fixed effects explaining, conditionally on all covariates, 
perfectly the dependent variable. 
